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Abstract—Recent investigations have shown that the sum
secure degrees of freedom of the Gaussian wiretap channel with
a helper is 1
2
. The achievable scheme for this result is based on
the real interference alignment approach. While providing a good
way to show degrees of freedom results, this technique has the
disadvantage of relying on the Khintchine-Groshev theorem and
is therefore limited to almost all channel gains. This means that
there are infinitely many channel gains, where the scheme fails.
Furthermore, the real interference alignment approach cannot
be used to yield stronger constant-gap results. We approach this
topic from a signal-scale alignment perspective and use the linear
deterministic model as a first approximation. Here we can show a
constant-gap sum capacity for certain channel gain parameters.
We transfer these results to the Gaussian model and discuss the
results.
I. INTRODUCTION
The wiretap channel, introduced by Wyner [1], represents
a channel model where a user wants to communicate a
message to its legitimate receiver, without leaking information
to an eavesdropper. The problem was solved for the degraded
wiretap channel by Wyner, and subsequently generalized to the
general wiretap channel by Csiszar and Ko¨rner [2]. Moreover,
the extension towards the Gaussian case was investigated
by Leung-Yan-Cheon and Hellman [3]. This model served
a long time as a standard model for physical-layer security.
However, in recent years cellular communication became
increasingly important. In [4] the so-called Gaussian wiretap
multiple-access channel (GMAC-WT) was introduced, where
the general wiretap setting is investigated in a multi-user
structure. Unfortunately, a general solution was out of reach
and a branch of research focused on the secure degrees of
freedom (s.d.o.f) instead. The s.d.o.f are a way to measure
how a systems secrecy capacity scales, with power going
to infinity, in comparison to the capacity of the single-link
AWGN channel. A key technique for achieving degrees-of-
freedom in multi-user wireless network model without secrecy
constraints is interference alignment (IA), introduced in [5]
and [6], among others. The main idea of IA is to design
signals of multiple users such that the interference will be
aligned in a small dimension at the unintended receivers. In
that way, interference-free dimensions can be maximized for
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the intended signals. IA methods can be divided into two
categories [7], the vector-space alignment approach and the
signal-scale alignment approach. In the vector-space alignment
approach, standard signaling dimensions such as time, fre-
quency and multiple-antennas will be used for the alignment.
The drawback of these methods are, that the channel model
needs to have sufficient independent dimensions for the align-
ment. Single-antenna, frequency-flat and time constant channel
models cannot utilize these techniques. For these channel
models, the signal-scale alignment approach can be used,
which utilizes signal scale dimensions. An example for such
methods are lattice codes, which can be used to specifically
design the used signal-scale. Signal-scale alignment techniques
can be further subdivided into signal-strength deterministic
models and real interference alignment. The latter one uses
integer lattice transmit constellations, which are scaled such
that alignment can be achieved. The intended messages are
then recovered by minimum-distance decoding, where the
Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation
theory is used to bound the minimum distance and therefore
the error. As a result, decoding can be shown to work for for
almost all channel gains and a number of d.o.f achievability
results utilized this approach. This is an unsatisfying situation,
since it still leaves an infinite amount of channel gains, for
which the technique does not work. Furthermore, it leaves the
impression that secrecy is dependent on the precision of the
channel gain measurements. Moreover, this method is limited
to d.o.f. results, meaning that it cannot be used for stronger
constant-gap capacity results. On the other hand, the signal-
strength deterministic approach is based on the deterministic
approximation of the channel models. An example for such
an approximation is the so-called linear deterministic model
(LDM), introduced by [8]. The model is based on a binary
expansion of the real signals, where the additive noise is intro-
duced as a truncation of the resulting bit-vectors. Furthermore,
superposition is modeled as binary addition on each individual
bit-level and channel gains are introduced as down-shifts of the
bit-vectors. As a result one gets a deterministic model, which
is entirely based on the channel gains. It could be shown in
[9], [10], [11], [16], that a layered lattice coding approach
can transfer the results of the LDM to the Gaussian models,
enabling constant bit-gap results.
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Figure 1. Gaussian wiretap channel with one helper.
Previous work and Contributions: Previous work on
the wiretap channel in multi-user settings mainly utilized
the real IA approach in addition to cooperative jamming,
introduced in [12]. The idea of using IA in a secrecy context
is to cooperatively jam the eavesdropper, while aligning the
jamming signal in a small subspace at the legitimate receiver.
A specialized model is the wiretap channel with a helper. This
model consists of the standard wiretap channel model, with a
second independent user, whose only purpose is to jam the
eavesdropper. In [13] and [14], the real IA approach was used
on the wiretap channel with a helper (with and without CSIT,
respectively) to investigate the s.d.o.f, therefore achieve results
for the infinite SNR regime. In this paper, we approach the
problem of the wiretap channel with a helper from a different
perspective. We follow the signal-strength approach and use
the LDM to approximate the channel model and derive a
constant bit-gap result for it. Furthermore, we use a layered
lattice coding strategy to transform the achievable scheme to
the Gaussian channel model, similar to the technique used in
[16]. We also use previous results of [10], to relate the converse
of the LDM to the Gaussian model and thereby providing a
constant bit-gap results for a certain range of channel gains.
Due to the approximate nature of the LDM, the achievable
scheme fails to reach the upper bound at some channel gain
configurations. We analyse these cases and discuss the results.
Notation: We denote vectors and matrices by lower case
bold and upper case bold characters, respectively. For two
vectors a and b, we denote by [a;b] the vector that is obtained
by stacking a over b. To specify a particular range of elements
in a bit level vector we use the notation a[i:j] to indicate that a
is restricted to the bit levels i to j. If i = 1, it will be omitted
a[:j], the same for j=n a[i:]. Therefore a = a[:] which would
correspond to no restriction at all.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The Gaussian wiretap channel with a helper is defined as a
system consisting of 2 transmitters and 2 receivers. Where
X1 is the channel input of the user, communicating with
the legitimate receiver, with channel output Y1. Whereas X2
represents the channel input of an independent helper which
is trying to help the user to achieve a secure transmission.
Both channel inputs are also received by an eavesdropper with
channel output Y2. The channel itself is modeled with additive
white Gaussian noise, Z1, Z2. Therefore the system equations
can be written as
Y1 = h11X1 + h21X2 + Z1 (1a)
Y2 = h22X2 + h12X1 + Z2 (1b)
, where the channel inputs satisfy an input power constraint
E{|Xi|2} ≤ P for each i. Moreover the Gaussian noise
terms are assumed to be independent and zero mean with unit
variance, Zi ∼ CN (0, 1). A (2nR, n) code will consist of
an encoding and a decoding function. The encoder assigns a
codeword xn1 (w) to each message w, where W is uniformly
distributed over the set [1 : 2nR], and the associated decoder
assigns an estimate wˆ ∈ [1 : 2nR] to each observation
of Y n1 . A rate is said to be achievable if there exist a
sequence of (2nR, n) codes, for which the probability of error
P
(n)
e = (Wˆ 6= W ) goes to zero, as n goes to infinity
limn→∞ P
(n)
e = 0. As opposed to the general Gaussian
multiple access wiretap channel, the second channel input
is used as a pure helper. This means, instead of sending
codewords through X2, it is used as a jamming signal. A
message W is said to be information-theoretically secure if
the eavesdropper cannot reconstruct the message W from the
channel observation Y n2 . This means that the uncertainty of
the message is almost equal to its entropy, given the channel
observation:
1
nH(W |Y n2 ) ≥ 1nH(W )− , (2)
which leads to I(W ;Y n2 ) ≤ n for any  > 0. A secrecy rate
r is said to be achievable if it is achievable while obeying the
secrecy constraint (2).
III. THE LINEAR DETERMINISTIC MODEL SYSTEM
As simplification we will investigate the corresponding
linear deterministic model (LDM) of the system model as an
intermediate step. The LDM models the signals of the channel
as bit-vectors X, which is achieved by a binary expansion
of the input signal X . The positions within the bit-vector
are referred to as bit-levels. Furthermore, superposition of
different signals is modeled by binary addition of the bit-
levels itself. Carry over is not used to limit the superposition
on the specific level where it occurs. Truncation of the bit-
vector at noise level models the signal impairment of the
Gaussian noise, which yields a deterministic approximation of
the Gaussian model. Channel gains are included by shifting the
bit-vector for an appropriate number of bit-levels. This shift
is introduced by a shift-matrix S, which is defined as
S =

0 0 · · · 0 0
1 0 · · · 0 0
0 1 · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · 1 0
 . (3)
With S an incoming bit vector can be shifted for q−n positions
with Y = Sq−nX, where q := max{n}. The channel gain is
represented by nij-bit levels which corresponds to dlog SNRe
Y1 Y2
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Figure 2. Gaussian wiretap channel in the linear deterministic model.
of the original channel. With this definitions, the model can
be written as
Y1 = S
q−n11X′1 ⊕ Sq−n21X′2 (4a)
Y2 = S
q−n22X′2 ⊕ Sq−n12X′1, (4b)
where q := max{n11, n12, n21, n22}. For ease of notation, we
denote X1 = Sq−n11X′1 and X2 = S
q−n21X′2. Furthermore,
we denote Sq−n22X′2 and S
q−n12X′1 by X¯2 and X¯1, respec-
tively. We assume that the helper regulates its signal such that
it arrives with the same bit-level signal strength at Eve, as the
signal of Alice. From a security viewpoint, this is the optimal
behaviour since a weaker signal could not jam all of Alice
signal and would leave bit-levels unprotected. On the other
hand, if the jam signal would be stronger, it would not help
to improve security either and would just increase the power
load of the helper. We therefore assume that n22 = n12 =: n2.
A. Achievable Scheme
For the achievable scheme in the linear deterministic model
we can make a few observations. First of all, for n11 > n12,
we see that some bit-levels of the users signal fall below the
noise floor at Y2. These bit-levels can be used for secrecy,
even without a helper. We will denote this part as the private
signal part. We will call the rate of the private part rp. The
achievability of rp := (n11 − n2)+ is solely based on the
channel properties and not on a specific scheme. With the
correspondence n ←→ dlog SNRe+, we get a rate1 of rp =
dlog |h11|2P e+−dlog |h12|2P e+. We therefore get a partition
of the secrecy rate r := rp + rc, where rc is the achievable
secrecy rate for the common part. Since the following scheme
depends on the shift between the bit-vectors at Bob and at
Eve, there is a singularity at n11 = n21 at which the scheme
fails. This is because the scheme needs a difference in channel
strength in order to align the signals.
Theorem 1. The achievable secrecy rate of the linear deter-
ministic Wiretap channel with a helper is
rach =

max{n11 − n21, n21, rp} for n21n11 < 23
rp + rc for 23 ≤ n21n11 < 2
n11 for n21n11 ≥ 2
(5)
1This rate is the maximum for cases without a helper. It is therefore an
approximation of the Gaussian wiretap channel, where the capacity is known
to be Cs = log(1 + |h11|2P )− log(1 + |h12|2P ).
where rc :=
{
φ1(n
c
Y1
,∆) for n11 > n2 and n11 > n21
φ2(n
c
Y1
,∆) for everything else,
with ncY1 := n11− (n11−n2)+ and the function φi for p,q ∈ N
defined as
φ1(p, q) :=
{
(l(p,q))q
2 if l(p, q) is even,
p− (l(p,q)+1)q2 if l(p, q) is odd,
(6)
and
φ2(p, q) :=
{
(l(p,q)+1)q
2 if l(p, q) is odd,
p− l(p,q)q2 if l(p, q) is even,
(7)
with ∆ := |n11−n21|, l(p, q) := bpq c for q > 0 and l(p, 0) =
0.
Proof: In this part we will prove the achievability of the
common secrecy rate rc. The achievable scheme relies on a
partition of the bit-levels into intervals. Every bit-vector gets
partitioned into ∆ := |n11 − n21|-bit level sized partitions,
starting at the top, i.e. the most significant bit. For example,
the user signal at Y1 consists of bn11∆ c ∆ sized partitions
and a remainder partition with n11 − bn11∆ c bit-levels. The
partitions of the bit-vectors will be enumerated from the top
downwards. Now, all odd partitions of X1 will be used for
encoding of the message, while all odd partitions of X¯2 will
be used for jamming. Note that we used the jamming signal
at Y2 as basis, because the need for jamming is limited to
the wiretapper. Which means that in case n21 > n2, the part
X2,[n2+1:] can be left unused without secrecy penalty. Due to
the ∆-partitioning, the ∆-shift will result in an exact alignment
of the message partitions with the jamming partitions at Y2.
Moreover, at Y1, the used partitions will align with the unused
partitions, enabling the secrecy rate. We can therefore sum
over the bit-allocation of X1 to get the common part secrecy
rate. For an odd number of partitions, the remainder partition
is even (and therefore unused) and we just have to sum over
bn11∆ c partitions. Since only every second partition is used,
and accounting for an odd total number of partitions, the rate
rc follows for the case l(ncY1 ,∆) odd. Similarly for the case
of an even number of partitions. In that case one needs to
account for the remainder partition, which will be odd and is
therefore also used. As a special case, we need to consider
the situation with a non-zero private part, and weaker helper
signal at Y1. In this case, we cannot utilize the remainder-part,
since the jamming signal of the helper would fall in the private
part range. This results in one less allocatable ∆-partition and
yields the function φ1. For the range n21n11 <
2
3 , one can allocate
the whole helper-free common bit-levels at Yn1 . Together with
the private part, the achievable rate is reached. For the range
of n21n11 ≥ 2, the helper signal is strong enough to jam the
whole user signal at the eavesdropper, without affecting the
transmission to the legitimate receiver. Therefore the top n11
bits of X2 are used for jamming, while all of X1 is used for
signal transmission.
B. Converse
Theorem 2. The secrecy rate R of the linear deterministic
wiretap channel with one helper and symmetric channel gains
at the wiretapper is bounded from above by
R ≤ min{rub1, rub2, rub3}
with
rub1 = (n11 − n2)+ + 12 (max{n11, n21} − (n11 − n2)+)
+ 12 (n2 − n21)+
rub2 = n11
rub3 = n21 + (n11 − n21 − n2)+
+ [n2 − n21 − (n2 − n11 + n21)+]+
Proof:
We start as in [13] with the following procedure
nR = H(W |Yn1 ) + I(W ;Yn1 )
≤ I(W ;Yn1 ) + n
≤ I(W ;Yn1 )− I(W ;Yn2 ) + n2
= H(Yn1 )−H(Yn1 |W )−H(Yn2 ) +H(Yn2 |W ) + n2
= H(Yn1 )−H(Yn2 ) +H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 ) + n2 (8)
where Fanos inequality and the secrecy constraint was used.
In the last line we used that X1 is a function of W , and
X2 is independent of W . We remark that the first property
does not hold in general, since jamming through the first
user would result in a stochastic function. For the following
analyses we have to distinguish between the three cases
n21 > n2, n21 < n2 and n21 = n2. We begin with the
entropy difference H(Yn1 )−H(Yn2 ). First of all, in case that
n21 < n2, we have to split up the negative entropy part in
H(Yn2 ) = H(Y
n
2,[:n21]
) +H(Yn2,[n21+1:]|Yn2,[:n21]). The latter
term will be used with the terms H(X¯n2 ) − H(Xn2 ) which
yields
H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 )−H(Yn2,[n21+1:]|Yn2,[:n21])
≤ H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 )−H(Yn2,[n21+1:]|Yn2,[:n21],Xn1 )
= 0
In the following proof section we assume that n21 > n2.
The case n21 < n2 follows in a similar matter. We define
η := max{n11, n21}−(n11−n2)+ and η′ := n21−(n11−n2)+
to split the received signals in common and private parts. We
start by adding two of the terms and show
2(H(Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )−H(X¯n1 ⊕ X¯n2 ))
≤ 2H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[η+1:]) + 2H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[:η])
−2H(X¯n1 ⊕ X¯n2 ).
Note that the private part H((Xn1 ⊕ Xn2 )[η+1:]) is zero for
n11 ≤ n2. In the next step, we will analyse the entropy
difference. We will use a method inspired by [17] to show
the following
2(H(Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )−H(X¯n1 ⊕ X¯n2 ))
≤ 2H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[η+1:]) + 2H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[1:η])
−H(X¯n1 ⊕ X¯n2 |X¯n1 )−H(X¯n1 ⊕ X¯n2 |X¯n2 )
= 2H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[η+1:]) + 2H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[1:η]|)
−H(X¯n2 )−H(X¯n1 )
≤ 2H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[η+1:]) +H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[1:η])
+H(Xn2,[1:η′]) +H(X
n
1,[1:η])−H(X¯n2 )−H(X¯n1 ).
We now see that H(Xn1,[1:η′′]) − H(X¯n1 ) ≤ 0, because
the first term is just the common part and we have that
H(Xn2,[1:η′]) − H(X¯n2 ) depends on the actual channel gains.
For n21 < n2 these terms have the same strength due to
the split of H(Yn2 ) resulting in zero. For n21 > n2 we get
H(Xn2,[n2+1:η′]|X
n,c
2 ). Now one can divide all terms by two,
resulting in
H(Yn1 )−H(Yn2 )
≤ H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[η+1:]) +
1
2
H((Xn1 ⊕Xn2 )[:η])
+
1
2
(H(Xn2,[1:η′])−H(X¯n2 )).
We finalize the proof by plugging this result into (8), which
results in
nR ≤ H(Yn1 )−H(Yn2 ) +H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 ) + n2
≤ n(n11 − n2)+ + n 12 (max{n11, n21} − (n11 − n2)+)+
+ n 12 (n2 − n21)+ + n2
dividing by n and letting n→∞ shows the result.
For the case that β1 > 2 we have that
n(R− 2) ≤ H(Yn1 )−H(Yn2 ) +H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 )
≤ H(Xn1 ) +H(Xn2 )−H(Yn2 |X¯n1 ) +H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 )
= H(Xn1 )
≤ nn11
and for the case that β1 < 23 we have that
nR ≤ H(Yn1 )−H(Yn2 ) +H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 ) + n2
≤ H(Yn1,[:(n11−n21)]) +H(Yn1,[(n11−n21)+1:]|Yn1,[:(n11−n21)])
−H(Yn2 ) +H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 ) + n2
≤ H(Yn1,[:(n11−n21)]) +H(Yn1,[(n11−n21)+1:]|Yn1,[:(n11−n21)])
−H(Yn2,[:(n11−n21)])−H(Yn2,[(n11−n21)+1:]|Yn2,[:(n11−n21)],Xn1 )
+H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 ) + n2.
One can show that
H(Yn1,[:(n11−n21)])−H(Yn2,[:(n11−n21)])
≤ n(n11 − n21 − n2)+
and
H(X¯n2 )−H(Yn2,[(n11−n21)+1:]|Yn2,[:(n11−n21)],Xn1 )−H(Xn2 )
≤ n[n2 − n21 − (n2 − n11 + n21)+]+
and H(Yn1,[(n11−n21)+1:]|Yn1,[:(n11−n21)]) ≤ nn21 which yields
nR ≤ H(Yn1,[:(n11−n21)]) +H(Yn1,[(n11−n21)+1:]|Yn1,[:(n11−n21)])
−H(Yn2,[:(n11−n21)])
−H(Yn2,[(n11−n21)+1:]|Yn2,[:(n11−n21)],Xn1 )
+H(X¯n2 )−H(Xn2 ) + n2
≤ nn21 + n(n11 − n21 − n2)+
+ n[n2 − n21 − (n2 − n11 + n21)+]+ + n2
dividing by n and letting n→∞ shows the result.
IV. THE GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH A HELPER
In this section we analyse the Gaussian wiretap channel
with a helper. To get results we stick to the previously
developed scheme in section III-A, and we will transfer the
alignment and jamming structure to its Gaussian equivalent
with layered lattice codes. This will lead to an achievable rate
which is directly based on the deterministic rate. Moreover,
we will make use of results in [10] to show that the mutual
information of the Gaussian case can be upper bounded by
the deterministic terms. As a result, the deterministic bound
in section III-B is a bound for the Gaussian model as well,
with a constant bit-gap attached.
A. Achievable Scheme
Theorem 3. The achievable secrecy rate of the Gaussian
Wiretap channel with a helper is
rach =

max{log(SNR(1−β1)1 ), log(SNR2), rp} for β1 < 23
rp + rc − d for 23 ≤ β1 < 2
log(SNR1) for β1 ≥ 2
(9)
where rp := log(SNR1−β21 ) and r
c :={
φ1(log SNR
(1−(1−β2)+)
1 , log SNR
(1−β1)
1 ) for β1, β2 ≤ 1,
φ2(log SNR
(1−(1−β2)+)
1 , log SNR
(1−β1)
1 ) for everything else,
with the function φi as defined in (1) and d = blmaxc.
Proof: For the achievable scheme, we need to partition
the available power into intervals. Each of these intervals
plays the role of an ∆−Interval of bit-levels in the linear
deterministic scheme. Remember that we have E{|Xi|2} ≤ P
and Z1, Z2 ∼ CN (0, 1), which means that |h11|2P = SNR1
and |h21|2P = SNR2 represent the power of both direct
signals. As in the deterministic model, we assume that both
signals at Y2 are received with the same power and therefore
h12 = h22 = h2 which gives |h2|2P = SNR3. We introduce
the two parameters β1 and β2, which connects the SNR ratios
with SNR2 = SNR
β1
1 and SNR3 = SNR
β2
1 . Now we can
partition the received power at Y1 into intervals of SNR
(1−β1)
1 .
Each of the intervals has therefore signal power θl which is
defined as
θl = ql−1 − ql
= SNR1−(l−1)(1−β1)1 − SNR1−l(1−β1)1 (10)
with l indicating the specific level. The users decompose
the signals Xi into a sum of independent sub-signals Xi =∑lmax
l=1 Xil. For each of these sub-signals, a lattice code is
chosen as described in [18], such that it is good for channel
coding with an average power per dimension of θl. X1 is used
for signal transmission, while X2 is solely used for jamming.
As in the deterministic case, the objective is to align the signal
parts of X1 with the jamming of X2 at Y2, while allowing
decoding of the signal parts at Y1. Due to the signal scale
based coding strategy and the equal receive power at Y2, an
alignment is achieved with the proposed scheme. We therefore
need to prove, that the signal can be decoded at Y1.
1) Decoding procedure: The decoding is done level-wise,
treating subsequent levels as noise. Every level is treated as
a Gaussian point-to-point channel with power θl and noise
1 + 2SNR1−l(1−β1)1 , which consists of the base noise N1 at
Y1 and the power of all subsequent levels of both signals.
Successful decoding can be assured with a rate limitation of
rl ≤ log
(
θl
1 + 2SNR1−l(1−β1)1
)
, (11)
which ensures that a lattice code (γΛC + v) ∩ S exists with
arbitrary small error probability [18]. This code consists of a
lattice ΛC ∈ Rn, a scaling factor γ ∈ R, a translation v ∈ Rn
and a spherical shaping region S ⊂ Rn with power θl per
dimension.
2) Achievable rate: As in the deterministic case, we have
a private part in case that β2 < 1, which can be used
completely. Since it has only the base noise, a rate of rp =
log(SNR(1−β2)1 ) = log(SNR1)− log(SNR3) can be achieved.
For the common part we need to look into the scheme itself.
All odd levels of X1 will be used for signal transmission.
Every level l can handle a rate of rl. We have a total of dlmaxe
levels in X1, where lmax := 11−β1 . This sums up to a rate of
rc =
blmaxc∑
l=1
1odd log
(
θl
1 + 2SNR1−l(1−β1)1
)
, (12)
where we count only the odd levels towards the achievable
rate. Moreover, we need to consider the remainder term, which
is allocated between the alignment structure and the noise floor
or the private part (if β3 < 1). This term is zero for an odd
number of full levels and it is used, if there is an even number
of full levels. In that case the remainder term would yield a
rate of rR ≤ log(SNR1−dlmaxe(1−β1)1 − 1). Furthermore, we
can simplify the rate of (12) with
log
(
a− b
1 + cb
)
> log
(
a− b
1 + b
)
− log c
> log
(
1 + a
1 + b
)
− log(c)− 1
> log
( a
2b
)
− log(c)− 1
where we used that c, b > 1 and a−b1+b > 1 and get
rc >
blmaxc∑
l=1
1odd log
(
SNR1−(l−1)(1−β1)1
2SNR1−l(1−β1)1
)
− 2
> blmaxc2 log SNR
(1−β1)
1 − blmaxc
Combined with the remainder part, we see that we get
φ1(log SNR
(1−(1−β2)+)
1 , log SNR
(1−β1)
1 ) and for the case of
β2 < 1 we need to handle the private part. After some
modification, one can see that the same technique yields a
common rate of φ2(log SNR
(1−(1−β2)+)
1 , log SNR
(1−β1)
1 ).
B. Converse
For the converse, we make use of the linear deterministic
bound. We start with nR = I(W ;Y n1 )−I(W ;Y n2 )+n, where
we need to bound the two mutual information terms. We can
use a result of [10, Thm.1] for the complex Gaussian IC, which
shows that the capacity is within 42 bits of the deterministic
IC capacity. We can then re-use the deterministic techniques,
to show the converse, leading to the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The secrecy rate R of the Gaussian wiretap
channel with one helper and symmetric channel gains at the
wiretapper is bounded from above by
R ≤ min{rGub1, rGub2, rGub3}
with
rGub1 = (n11 − n2)+ + 12 (max{n11, n21} − (n11 − n2)+)
+ 12 (n2 − n21)+ + c
rGub2 = n11 + c
rGub3 = n21 + (n11 − n21 − n2)+
+ [n2 − n21 − (n2 − n11 + n21)+]+ + c
where c is a constant.
Proof:
nR ≤ I(W ;Y n1 )− I(W ;Y n2 ) + n
≤ I(W ;Yn1 )− I(W ;Yn2 ) + n+ nc
≤ n(n11 − n2)+ + n2 (n2 − n21)+
+ n2 (max{n11, n21} − (n11 − n2)+) + n+ nc.
Dividing by n and taking n→∞ shows the result of the first
bound. The other bounds can be shown similarly.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown an achievable scheme and a converse bound
for the sum capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel with
a helper which is tight for a certain range of parameters
(see Fig. 4). We used the linear deterministic approximation
of the model, to gain insights into the model structure, and
transferred those results to the Gaussian model, within a
constant gap. These techniques can be summarized as signal-
scale alignment methods, where we used jamming alignment
1
0.5
0.5 1
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Figure 3. Illustration of the achievable secrecy rate in relation to the single-
link scenario, and variation in the β2 parameter, while β1is fixed at 0.75.
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Figure 4. Illustration of the achievable secrecy rate in relation to the single-
link scenario, and variation in the β1 parameter, while β2 is fixed at 1.
at the eavesdropper in the signal-scale, while minimizing the
negative effect on the decoding at the legitimate receiver.
Looking into figures 3 and 4, one can see the achievable
rate scaled by the single-link channel, with varying parameters
β1, β2, i.e. channel gain configurations. These figures can be
interpreted as a form of generalized secure degrees of freedom,
where the minimum over the whole parameter range shows
the s.d.o.f of the system model. One can see that the figures
show s.d.o.f of 12 , which agrees with the results of [13]. Also
note that in Fig. 4, in the range of 23 ≤ β1 < 2, the achievable
scheme fluctuates between the upper bound and 12 . We believe
that this is a result of the approximation error, introduced by
the deterministic approximation and the bit-level techniques
which also gets transferred to the Gaussian model. A more
sensitive deterministic model, like the one used in [7], could
help to completely reach the upper bound. This would give a
constant-gap sum-capacity result for the whole range.
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